Monday, July 21, 2014

All Zimmerman or All Trayvon Martin

Many criminal defense lawyers studiously ignore cases that catch the public's attention. They just aren't that legally interesting, even if the facts or issues give rise to popular passion. And so it's been for the trial of George Zimmerman for murder 2º in the killing of Trayvon Martin.  Aside from John Steele's having raised the question of the ethics of overcharging, there hasn't been a whole lot to write about.

Now that the trial is coming to a close, however, an interesting question, both legal and tactical, has arisen: would it be best for the defense to take an all-or-nothing approach, murder 2º or acquittal, or a split-the-baby approach, charging the jury on the lesser-included crime of manslaughter. 

As Jacob Gershman writes at the Wall Street Journal law blog, the die has been cast.

George Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder in the shooting death of Trayvon Martin. So why do jurors now have an option of convicting him of manslaughter?

The short answer: the judge said they could.

Yet the option, which was supported by prosecutors but raised the hackles of the defense, is not clearly spelled out in Florida law.

Notwithstanding what either party individually contends, it remains the judge's responsibility to decide whether to submit a lesser-included offense to the jury if one party requests it.  So if the prosecution felt sufficiently secure in its case that it would get a murder conviction, while the defense feared conviction and was looking to find an out, they would be fighting against a manslaughter instruction lest the jury, feeling any sympathy toward the defendant, compromise.  That's not happening here.

While it may be that Zimmerman's claim of self-defense, that he feared his life to be so endangered as to allow him to lawfully kill another person, isn't entirely persuasive, there is strong support for his claim that he was in fear, even if he overreacted.

Florida law works differently. There’s no slicing and dicing of self-defense. The penal code doesn’t recognize “imperfect self defense.” The law forces juries to either believe that someone had a right to act in self-defense or is a murderer.

There is a loophole, however, as illustrated by Mr. Zimmerman’s trial, which entered into closing arguments Thursday.

In Florida, a judge can choose to give juries a middle-of-the-road option, saying it can convict someone of voluntary  manslaughter if it isn’t convinced that the defendant acted out of “ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent.” Voluntary manslaughter is a catch-all offense that includes a killing caused by “culpable negligence.”


That the prosecution chose to shoot low and hope for a compromise rather than a murder conviction, while the defense went for all-or-nothing and fought the lesser charge, reflects their view of the relative strength of their case. Not surprisingly, the prosecution is showing some serious weakness in its faith that its murder 2 charge will bear out. 

As John Steele argued before trial, there is a strong current of thought that the prosecution followed a political path, appeasing angry voices demanding Justice for Trayvon without giving the facts of the case much thought. It appears that the trial evidence has borne this out to a large extent.

But most damning is the prosecution's second request of Judge Debra Nelson.

Prosecutor Richard Mantei argued that instructions for third-degree murder should be included on the premise that Zimmerman committed child abuse when he fatally shot 17-year-old Trayvon Martin because Martin was underage.

But defense attorney Don West called the proposed instruction "a trick," and he accused the prosecutor of springing it on the defense at the last minute.

"Just when I didn't think this case could get any more bizarre, the state is alleging child abuse?" West said. "This is outrageous. It's outrageous the state would seek to do this at this time."

So a reduced charge of manslaughter still isn't sufficient for the prosecution to reach its comfort zone, and it's digging even deeper for an even lesser charge of murder 3º.  Not only is that damning and humiliating, but as West says, it's "outrageous."  What's next, trespassing because Zimmerman walked on somebody else's lawn?

It appears that while the judge hasn't tossed the murder 2º count as being legally insufficient, which would seem to address the ethical question of the charge being within the very large ballpark of reasonable charges under the facts of the case, neither the judge nor the prosecution has much faith that the jury will convict. The prosecution is now grasping at straws, hoping to get a conviction for anything it can.

For the defense, given the evidence that's come in, this isn't a good thing or particularly fair thing. They tried a case to the charge, and are now faced with the possibility of a compromise verdict from a jury that might feel badly enough at the death of a young man (which is quite understandable, regardless of whether he contributed to it) to feel that Zimmerman ought to be convicted of something. 

While this isn't the way it's supposed to go in theory, it's a nightmare for the defense, having fought the charge only to face being skewered by a compromise.






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Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/12/all-zimmerman-or-all-trayvon-martin-2.aspx?ref=rss

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Change of Plea Out the Window!

Most prosecutors will negotiate with accused offenders. Obviously, this is done to move the trial court calendar along, eliminate the need to tie up resources that could be used elsewhere, truly not needed when the defendant is willing to change a plea. Even in civil matters, parties negotiate settlements in order to achieve reasonable business outcomes and reduce the cost of litigation.

In at least one civil instance, an insurance company said they will not settle any case, large or small, that everything had to go to trial. This clearly delays the outcomes … and enables the insurance carrier to withhold payment for some time. I’ve not seen any studies about the merits of such activities from the carrier’s perspective. It does, however, frustrate plaintiffs. Frustration without economic benefit is hardly a good business outcome. And the carrier has since reversed this policy.

Now, we have a new version. The State Bar of California has announced that it will refuse to accept “no contest” pleas from lawyers accused of ethics violations. The issue here is not one of criminal liability, but rather of retaining one’s license to practice law. One has to ask what more can be given to the Bar once the lawyer-accused has agreed to take his/her punishment?

The Office of Trial Counsel maintains that accused lawyers are not accepting responsibility for their actions unless they are tried and convicted or accept a guilty plea. That is why they will not accept a nolo contendere plea. Other than civil damages, the effect of a nolo plea is the same … and punishment is no less. Criminal prosecutors understand this. But, the Bar wants its “pound of flesh.” It is questionable whether this is a question of morality.
This is just one more example of the California State Bar’s new adversarial attitude toward its members … Although the legislative directive to the State Bar is that its primary, if not sole, function is to protect the public (not help its members who pay all the expenses of the Bar), one has to wonder how the public is being better helped by this new approach.

Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/-ANxxuDCoWg/

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Federal appeals court upholds university's consideration of race in admissions

[JURIST] The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit [official website] ruled [opinion, PDF] Tuesday that the University of Texas at Austin (UT) may continue considering race as part of its admission criteria. The US Supreme Court [official website] had remanded the case [JURIST report], Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin [SCOTUSblog backgrounder], to the appeals court last year after finding that the court did not hold UT to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter...

Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/07/federal-appeals-court-upholds-universitys-consideration-of-race-in-admissions.php

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Sunday, July 20, 2014

Patent Law — Best Practices as Seen From the Bench

Three U.S. district judges and a U.S. magistrate participated in a roundtable discussion in Dallas, "Patent Law: Best Practices As Seen From The Bench."

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202607411492&rss=newswire

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77% of Lawyers Can’t Be Trusted With Confidential Client Data

All lawyers have an ethical obligation to employ security measures when sharing information and data with their clients. Whether that means encrypting all important emails or properly researching cloud based file-sharing services like Dropbox, it is incumbent on lawyers to understand the levels of security available. LexisNexis recently did a survey on what tools lawyers and legal professionals are using to protect their clients' privileged information. 77% of the lawyers surveyed did not have adequate security for their confidential client data. How important is encryption and what can lawyers do to change the way they share data?
On this episode of Digital Detectives, Sharon Nelson and John Simek interview Bob Ambrogi, a lawyer and journalist who recently wrote about the LexisNexis survey. They ask him about the implications of the survey, what security measures lawyers should be taking, how frequently clients are hurt by lack of security, and why lawyers are generally resistant to learning about data encryption. Ambrogi explains that an overall lack of information, ignored ethics rulings, lack of time, and assumed difficulty are the reasons lawyers often refuse to learn how to safely share data. He encourages lawyers, especially the ones in small or solo firms, to seek out a consultant to learn about the relatively easy encryption tools and techniques. After all, no lawyer wants to be a part of the 77%.
Bob Ambrogi is a Massachusetts lawyer and journalist and has covered legal technology and the Internet for two decades. He writes the "Ambrogi on Tech" column for the ABA Journal and his blog LawSites, launched in 2002, is in the ABA Journal Blawg 100 Hall of Fame. Since 2005, he has co-hosted the legal-affairs podcast Lawyer 2 Lawyer also on the Legal Talk Network.
Special thanks to our sponsor, Digital WarRoom.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/digital-detectives/2014/07/77-lawyers-cant-trusted-confidential-client-data

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THE NLJ 350: The NLJ 350 Regional Report: The Top U.S. and International Markets

Our Regional Report takes the headcount numbers from our NLJ 350 survey and dices up the data, region by region. • See the complete 2014 NLJ 350 survey results.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1402583484262?rss=rss_nlj

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The Best of the Plaintiffs Bar

These 19 firms are at the cutting edge of plaintiffs' work -- and are giving defense players a run for their money.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202624154645?rss=rss_nlj

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Twitter: A Sleeping Discovery Giant?

Attorney Daniel Cummins and staff reporter Ben Present discuss the emerging issue of social media law. In this installment, the two discuss the differences between Facebook and Twitter, and whether Twitter posts can be discoverable.

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202594676587&rss=newswire

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Does A Consumer’s Exercise of a Rescission Right Mean that the Loan Is Automatically Rescinded? Perhaps Not, According to One Federal Court, If the Consumer Does Not Also File a Lawsuit for Rescission

In Baker v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 5:13-CV-92-F, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9578 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2014), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that even if a consumer timely exercises his or her right to rescind a loan transaction under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. — i.e., during the three-day statutory “cooling-off” period — that exercise does not automatically cause the loan to be rescinded.  Rather, the court held, if a consumer’s notice of rescission is met with silence by the lender, the consumer must also file a lawsuit in order to complete the rescission before the statute of limitations expires (in this case, the statute of limitations was determined to be four years).   The Baker case provides a thorough interpretation of the effect of the statutory three-day “cooling-off” period, for which, it was noted in the decision, case law is “exceedingly sparse.”

In Baker, the consumer entered into a refinancing transaction knowing that the terms were less favorable than the consumer had been quoted.  Two days after closing the loan, the consumer mailed a signed rescission notice to the lender. The lender did not respond to the notice and funded the consumer loan.  The lender allegedly refused to rescind the transaction despite multiple requests from the consumer.  The consumer, unable to refinance on more favorable terms, eventually became delinquent on the loan and foreclosing procedures were initiated.  Personal bankruptcy proceedings resulted in a discharge of the personal obligations under the loan but the foreclosure proceedings continued on the basis of the lender’s security interest in the property.

This case arose when the consumer responded to the continued foreclosure proceedings by filing an action for rescission pursuant to the TILA, nearly six years after the original notice of rescission had been sent to the lender.  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The consumer argued that the rescission automatically voided the security interest pursuant to Section 1635(b) of the TILA, which provides that “when an obligor exercises his right to rescind . . . he is not liable for any finance or other charge and any security interest given by the obligor . . . becomes void upon such a rescission” (emphasis added).  The consumer argued that this sentence provided for an automatic right of rescission that voided the transaction so long as the consumer sent notice of rescission within the three day statutory period.

The court disagreed.  Instead, the Court distinguished between the “exercise” of the right of rescission and “full rescission.”  The exercise of the right to rescind is accomplished by the giving of notice, whereas the full rescission is defined by a “full unwinding of the transaction and a return to the status quo.”  Because the security interest becomes void only upon rescission, the lender maintained a security interest that could be foreclosed upon until such time as the transaction was fully rescinded.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court declined to follow unpublished decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (which includes California) and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (within the Third Circuit), which had previously held that the notification made pursuant to the TILA automatically voided a security interest.  Rather, the Baker court held, where, as here, a lender fails to respond to a consumer’s exercise of his or her right to rescission within the three day statutory period, the consumer “must file a lawsuit to complete the rescission process in cases where the lender fails to respond to the notice or otherwise fails to recognize the borrower’s rescission rights.”

It is worth noting here that the Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 28, 2014 to a case which hinges on the question of whether or not the TILA right of rescission for the lender’s failure to furnish required disclosures must be invoked by filing a lawsuit or whether such rescission is automatic upon notice made within the three-year statutory period.  See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. granted, No. 13-684 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2014).

The Baker court also disagreed with the consumer that lawsuits seeking rescission pursuant to the TILA have an unlimited limitations period.  The court held that such a limitations period would cloud title to property to such an extent that Congress could not have intended that the right of rescission have an unlimited limitations period.  However, the court did not wade too deeply into the debate regarding which statute of limitations was appropriate.  Here, the right of rescission — that is, the right to sue for rescission — arose at the very latest when the lender failed to respond to the notice of rescission within the twenty day statutory period.  The suit in Baker was filed nearly six years later and therefore must have been untimely.  Although the court discussed the conflicting decisions of a number of other courts that placed the statute of limitations at the one-year and three-year mark, the court in Baker ultimately concluded that the relevant statute of limitation is “at most four years” and continues its analysis no further.

Given the uncertainties in the statute of limitations noted by the court, which identified decisions concluding the statute of limitations in these cases is as short as one-year, three-years or “at most four years,” the fate of individual rescission claims will remain varied.  In addition, a consumer may be required to assert a claim for rescission in order to effect the full rescission desired, but a lender that fails to take “any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest” within twenty days after receiving notice of rescission remains liable for civil penalties.  Although such civil penalties are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, the TILA does provide for attorney’s fees in cases where the lender violates the TILA by failing to respond to a timely notice of rescission.  Thus a lender would still be wise to consider the risks and costs of litigation, civil penalties and attorney’s fees before ignoring a notice for rescission.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/05/does-a-consumers-exercise-of-a-rescission-right-mean-that-the-loan-is-automatically-rescinded-perhaps-not-according-to-one-federal-court-if-the-consumer-does-not-also-file-a-lawsuit-for-re/

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Heidi Alexander Interviews Jack Newton Live at the Mass LOMAP Conference

Heidi Alexander, co-host of The Legal Toolkit on Legal Talk Network, interviews Jack Newton about his featured presentation, "Delivering a Cloud Experience" at Mass LOMAP's 4th Annual Super Marketing Conference. In the presentation, he explains how cloud technology such as client portals, online document review, secure live communications, and online billing can improve how lawyers market their client experience. Newton is the founder and CEO of Clio, a company that provides web-based practice management systems and client collaboration platforms for small- to mid-sized law firms.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/special-reports/2014/07/heidi-alexander-interviews-jack-newton-live-mass-lomap-conference

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Bryan Garner on the Latest Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary

Due out this week is the 10th edition of Black's Law Dictionary. With 16,000 new definitions, 900 new maxims, and terms dated back to their first English usage, Black's Law Dictionary 10th Edition is touted to be the most comprehensive and relevant collection of legal terminology to date. But what goes into making this legal reference and how does it stay relevant in today's world? On this episode of Lawyer 2 Lawyer, hosts Bob Ambrogi and J. Craig Williams interview Black's Law Dictionary's editor-in-chief Professor Bryan A. Garner. Together they discuss the army of 300 professionals and scholars who deciphered true meanings from historic documents, ancient language, and modern usage. Tune in to hear Garner describe what goes into updating Black's and why he believes attorneys will continue to use it for generations to come.
Bryan A. Garner is a U.S. lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher who has written several books about English usage and style, including Garner's Modern American Usage and Elements of Legal Style. He has served as editor-in-chief of Black's Law Dictionary since 1995, and coauthored two books with Justice Antonin Scalia: Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, and Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. Professor Garner is a prolific lecturer, having taught more than 2,500 writing workshops since the 1991 founding of his company, LawProse, Inc., and he is a distinguished Research Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.

Source: http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/lawyer-2-lawyer/2014/05/bryan-garner-latest-edition-blacks-law-dictionary

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Saturday, July 19, 2014

Not The Most Enlightened Sex Education Program

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The source for today’s Juice? A Change.org petition that came The Juice’s way. No doubt this law will end homosexuality in Alabama… Clearly a class adhering to the requirements of this law cannot be called sex “education.” The law is Section 16-40A-2 of the Alabama Code:

MINIMUM CONTENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN SEX EDUCATION PROGRAM OR CURRICULUM

… (c) Course materials and instruction that relate to sexual education or sexually transmitted diseases should include all of the following elements:

… (8) An emphasis, in a factual manner and from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the state.

This is just stupid and wrong on so many levels. Who is this “general public” referring to? Not the American public.  And “homosexual conduct is a criminal offense”? Sure, some of it is (sodomy). But what about two men holding hands? You can read the full text of this small-minded, bigoted law here.

Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/Ft6jrcrMH2w/asdf-32.html

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Rachel Vitti: School superintendent's wife making her own mark on educational and human rights issues (Florida Times-Union)

Share With Friends: Share on FacebookTweet ThisPost to Google-BuzzSend on GmailPost to Linked-InSubscribe to This Feed | Rss To Twitter | Law - Video Stories, News Feeds and News via Feedzilla.

Source: http://news.feedzilla.com/en_us/stories/law/video/383661783?client_source=feed&format=rss

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Hey, This Looks Like A Good Place To Pull Over.

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So nice of you to pull over here! As reported by The Williamson Daily News (Williamson, West Virginia):

Patsy L. Kidwell, 48, and Ransom Lee Endicott, 52, both of Delbarton, were arrested after officers allegedly received a call notifying them that two individuals were unconscious in the front seat of a white Chevrolet. The car was parked outside the state police Williamson detachment, within walking distance of Trooper First Class J.K. Harris, who saw both defendants, seemingly unconscious in the vehicle.

So it turns out it wasn’t such a good place to pull over.

Harris woke both individuals and asked them to get out of the vehicle. Endicott got out of the car first and allegedly was unsteady on his feet with slurred speech. Harris conducted an officer safety pat down on Endicott, at which time a hard object reportedly was felt in the right front jeans pocket of the defendant. Endicott advised the officer that the object was a bottle of pain pills, according to the police report.

Both defendants performed each of the three standardized sobriety field tests unsatisfactorily and were placed under arrest for driving under the influence.

 

 

Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/8rGGPBxnjik/hey-looks-like-good-place-pull.html

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DOJ Charges FedEx in Prescription Drug Shipping Probe

WASHINGTON—The Justice Department on Thursday charged FedEx Corp. with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances for its alleged role in transporting painkillers and other prescription drugs that had been sold illegally.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/18/doj-charges-fedex-in-prescription-drug-shipping-probe/?mod=WSJBlog

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EEOC can use Teamsters-style pattern-or-practice theory under Title VII § 706

Serrano sued in a class action claiming sex discrimination and the EEOC intervened. The trial court ruled for the employer on a number of issues; the 6th Circuit reversed. Serrano and EEOC v. Cintas Corp (6th Cir 11/09/2012).

The main issue was whether EEOC could pursue a pattern-or-practice style claim pursuant to § 706 of Title VII.

The employer argued that under § 706 the EEOC is limited to proving its allegations of discrimination pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 US 792 (1973), burden-shifting framework, and cannot use the pattern-or-practice framework announced by the Supreme Court in Teamsters v. United States, 431 US 324 (1977). The court rejected that argument. Even though the Teamsters case arose under § 707, the theory of that case can be used under § 706.

The trial court erred in holding that the employer was entitled to judgment on the pleadings in light of the EEOC's failure to plead its intent to rely on the Teamsters framework. Although the EEOC's complaint "is not a model of good lawyering," a plaintiff need not indicate at the pleading stage which circumstantial evidentiary framework it plans to use.

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/11/eeoc_can_use_te.html

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DePuy Hip Implant Deal Excludes Thousands

Just weeks after DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. announced a $2.5 billion settlement to resolve the bulk of the litigation over its recalled hip implants, some lawyers have raised concerns about the thousands of patients excluded from the deal and the process that determines how the plaintiffs will be compensated.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202631268495?rss=rss_nlj

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Change of Plea Out the Window!

Most prosecutors will negotiate with accused offenders. Obviously, this is done to move the trial court calendar along, eliminate the need to tie up resources that could be used elsewhere, truly not needed when the defendant is willing to change a plea. Even in civil matters, parties negotiate settlements in order to achieve reasonable business outcomes and reduce the cost of litigation.

In at least one civil instance, an insurance company said they will not settle any case, large or small, that everything had to go to trial. This clearly delays the outcomes … and enables the insurance carrier to withhold payment for some time. I’ve not seen any studies about the merits of such activities from the carrier’s perspective. It does, however, frustrate plaintiffs. Frustration without economic benefit is hardly a good business outcome. And the carrier has since reversed this policy.

Now, we have a new version. The State Bar of California has announced that it will refuse to accept “no contest” pleas from lawyers accused of ethics violations. The issue here is not one of criminal liability, but rather of retaining one’s license to practice law. One has to ask what more can be given to the Bar once the lawyer-accused has agreed to take his/her punishment?

The Office of Trial Counsel maintains that accused lawyers are not accepting responsibility for their actions unless they are tried and convicted or accept a guilty plea. That is why they will not accept a nolo contendere plea. Other than civil damages, the effect of a nolo plea is the same … and punishment is no less. Criminal prosecutors understand this. But, the Bar wants its “pound of flesh.” It is questionable whether this is a question of morality.
This is just one more example of the California State Bar’s new adversarial attitude toward its members … Although the legislative directive to the State Bar is that its primary, if not sole, function is to protect the public (not help its members who pay all the expenses of the Bar), one has to wonder how the public is being better helped by this new approach.

Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/-ANxxuDCoWg/

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Kirkland Snags M&A Tax Partner From Skadden

Kirkland & Ellis LLP has hired tax and mergers-and-acquisitions partner Dean Shulman from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/16/kirkland-snags-ma-tax-partner-from-skadden/?mod=WSJBlog

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Friday, July 18, 2014

Unanimous Vote Could Mean Reduced Penalties For 46,000 Defendants

The U.S. Sentencing Commission voted Friday on a recommendation that Congress lower certain mandatory drug sentences retroactively. The move could cut almost two years off of thousands of prisoners' sentences.

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Source: http://www.npr.org/2014/07/18/332636931/unanimous-vote-could-mean-reduced-penalties-for-46-000-defendants?ft=1&f=1070

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What Would Atticus Have Done?

Hearing that the mob was going to storm the jail and lynch Tom Robinson, the fictional Atticus Finch stood at the doorway to block their entrance. Among criminal defense lawyers, Atticus Finch is revered as a paragon of honor. Not all lawyers saw it that way.

In 1992, Monroe Freedman, a legal ethics expert, published two articles in the national legal newspaper Legal Times calling for the legal profession to set aside Atticus Finch as a role model. Freedman argued that Atticus still worked within a system of institutionalized racism and sexism and should not be revered. Freedman's article sparked a flurry of responses from attorneys who entered the profession holding Atticus Finch as a hero, and the reason they became lawyers. Critics of Atticus such as Freedman maintain that Atticus Finch is morally ambiguous and does not use his legal skills to challenge the racist status quo in Maycomb.
Monroe H. Freedman, ""Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P.,"" 14 LEGAL TIMES 20 (1992); Monroe H. Freedman, ""Finch: The Lawyer Mythologized,"" 14 LEGAL TIMES 25 (1992) and Monroe Freedman, Atticus Finch – Right and Wrong, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 473 (1994).
While Atticus might have fulfilled the highest calling of a lawyer, Freedman saw the character as failing his calling as a human being in a racist society, and considered that to be a fatal flaw.

Yesterday was Race Day at the New York Times, where two op-eds argued the failure of a certain verdict in Florida was due to the one word unspoken throughout the trial, race.  In a "surprising" choice that suggests the power of an excellent public relations team, one op-ed was by Gloria Allred's daughter, Lisa Bloom, who, after explaining the basis for her assumption about what was inside George Zimmerman's head, illuminated the race issue with the insightful:

Huh?
In contrast, Cardozo lawprof Ekow Yankah invokes the spirit of his fellow lawprof, Freedman, in writing:

The anger felt by so many African-Americans speaks to the simplest of truths: that race and law cannot be cleanly separated. We are tired of hearing that race is a conversation for another day. We are tired of pretending that “reasonable doubt” is not, in every sense of the word, colored.

Every step Mr. Martin took toward the end of his too-short life was defined by his race. I do not have to believe that Mr. Zimmerman is a hate-filled racist to recognize that he would probably not even have noticed Mr. Martin if he had been a casually dressed white teenager.
This conforms with my assumption as well. I find it impossible to believe that Zimmerman's perception of Martin as being "a punk" wasn't colored by race. Sure, there was also youth and attire, but it was part of the whole package. And to the extent that his skin color played a role in his perception that this was a kid who needed to be followed, who posed a threat of doing something wrong, it is racist.  Maybe not white hooded, cross-burning racism, but racist nonetheless.

This isn't a legal argument, however. Bloom and Yankah are both writing from the legal perspective, but what they are writing about isn't legal. It's sociological, a condemnation of a society that is still racist despite having a black president.  Anyone who thinks it's "problem solved" is delusional.

But Yankah contends that it is "the simplest of truths: that race and law cannot be cleanly separated."  Cleanly? No, it probably can't be cleanly separated, though it's similarly unclear that this constitutes "the simplest of truths." There is nothing simple about it.

It gives rise to a troubling question, that Yankah fails to adequately address and is way over Bloom's head.

What is reasonable to do, especially in the dark of night, is defined by preconceived social roles that paint young black men as potential criminals and predators. Black men, the narrative dictates, are dangerous, to be watched and put down at the first false move. This pain is one all black men know; putting away the tie you wear to the office means peeling off the assumption that you are owed equal respect. Mr. Martin’s hoodie struck the deepest chord because we know that daring to wear jeans and a hooded sweatshirt too often means that the police or other citizens are judged to be reasonable in fearing you.

We know this, yet every time a case like this offers a chance for the country to tackle the evil of racial discrimination in our criminal law, courts have deliberately silenced our ability to expose it. The Supreme Court has held that even if your race is what makes your actions suspicious to the police, their suspicions are reasonable so long as an officer can later construct a race-neutral narrative.

Being fully willing to accept that race factored into Zimmerman's perception, based on my own personal bias, the question that remains unanswered is what should the law have done about it?

Does the introduction of race by the prosecution into Zimmerman's perceptions alter the rule of self-defense? Does it render his subsequent conduct unlawful, even if it would have been lawful otherwise? Should there be two rules of law, one for interactions between people of different races where perceptions of the significance of conduct is assumed to be racially related, if not motivated? 

To point out that we still live in a society where race remains a pervasive unresolved issue is to state the obvious. To suggest that the criminal law should accommodate it is to present an intractable problem. Atticus Finch didn't hesitate to put his life on the line for his client, a black man accused of raping a white woman. But he didn't do enough because he didn't confront the racist society in defending Tom Robinson?

If the prosecution had been allowed, and inclined, to argue that George Zimmerman's conduct was racially motivated, and that his ultimate decision to shoot and kill Trayvon Martin was, at least in the tiniest of ways, based upon his race, would that have rendered his belief that he was about to suffer death or serious injury unreasonable?  If his head was being beaten against concrete by a white youth, as opposed to a black youth, would the harm have been different?

The argument that this scenario would never have commenced had Trayvon Martin been a white youth in a sports jacket and khakis is likely true. It's pure speculation no matter how much your head screams "yes, yes, yes," of course, but still. Yet how would the law have been any different at the point where a shot was fired? 

If we are to have a nation of laws to guide ourselves, how do we draw these vague, fuzzy lines where the law ceases to apply, where it's a free for all, where there is no longer a fixed right and wrong and everything becomes a matter of feelings, assumptions and personal perspective?  Yankah may be right that race and law cannot be cleanly separated in our collective consciousness, but then we cease to be a nation of laws when we ignore one for the other.

You might prefer that to happen here, but will you feel the same when you sit in the defendant's chair?  So what would Atticus Finch have done? He would have defended George Zimmerman based on the law, even if he failed to meet Monroe Freedman's expectation that he not be morally ambiguous. Atticus Finch would have still been the paragon of honor, even in the face of societal condemnation. That's what criminal defense lawyers do. That's what we are sworn to do.

 

 

 



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Source: http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/07/16/what-would-atticus-have-done.aspx?ref=rss

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Are you still practicing law?

In years gone by, many people attended law school because a legal education enhanced their skills. In today’s world, entry into law school  is first evaluated based on ROI, return on investment. And, in some instances, the comparison is coming up short. After the Great Recession, getting a job after law school was not guaranteed. Law school graduates, in addition to being uncertain about their job market, faced extraordinary debt burden.

A 2012 survey indicates that at least 24% of law school graduates are not practicing law. Rather, they were finding their way into nonprofit and education sectors and the federal government. This compares with9% in a similar 2003  survey. One factor pushing this statistic is the need to reduce or pay some of that student debt.

And when considering whether lawyers are satisfied in their chosen career, measured against whether they would go to law school again if given the opportunity, almost 2 out of seven said “no.” This latter statistic seems to be consistent with similar statistics of earlier years. In the 1970s, in response to a survey that I commissioned with the State Bar of California, almost 1/3 of the respondents indicated they were not satisfied with the practice. But they didn’t have the huge amount of debt that today’s graduates are carrying.  I suspect that what keeps people enrolling in law school is another statistic:  those graduates with the highest grade point averages have median pay levels that exceed $121,500, more than those who achieve the lowest grades. This is a significant difference, and the reason for the continued attraction of law schools.

Source: http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/LawBizBlog/~3/XBIYiT9hnPg/

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BofA, Justice Split over Mortgage Pact; Fox Deal Would Draw Antitrust Scrutiny

The AM Roundup: Law Blog rounds up the morning's news.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/17/bofa-justice-split-over-mortgage-pact-fox-deal-would-draw-antitrust-scrutiny/?mod=WSJBlog

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Justices Unlikely to Smile on Anti-Death Penalty Ruling

A federal judge's decision striking down California's death penalty would be unlikely to receive a warm reception from the U.S. Supreme Court, which repeatedly has turned away similar challenges during the past 20 years.

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202663590948&rss=newswire

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OPINION: A Calculation of Fido's Value Must Include Warm, Fuzzy Factor

Awarding traditional property damages in cases of injured or killed pets falls short.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202631180028?rss=rss_nlj

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France court sentences 9 to prison for terrorist associations

[JURIST] The Criminal Court of Paris [official website, in French] sentenced nine men to prison on Friday for belonging to terrorist groups and plotting attacks against France, in violation of France's terrorism law [text, in French]. Only two of the men were present for the hearing, the others being tried in absentia [Figaro report, in French]. All denied being fighters or having planned attacks.The men were sentenced to terms in prison [AP report] between two and nine years. Authorities across...

Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/07/france-court-sentences-9-to-prison-for-terrorist-associations.php

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Bahrain opposition leader charged over meeting with US diplomat

[JURIST] The public prosecutor's office of the government of Bahrain [official website] said Thursday that the country's most senior opposition leader and one of his aides will be charged for holding an illegal meeting with a US diplomat from the office of the US Secretary of State [official website]. The Bahraini nationals are Sheikh Ali Salman, the leader of the al-Wefaq party [GU Berkley Center backgrounder], and his political aide Khalil al-Marzouq. The US diplomat is Tom Malinowski, US Assistant...

Source: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/07/bahrain-opposition-leader-charged-over-meeting-with-us-diplomat.php

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Thursday, July 17, 2014

Pharma sales reps are FLSA exempt as outside salesmen (5-4)

This morning the US Supreme Court decided - on a 5-4 vote - that pharmaceutical sales representatives are "outside salesmen" and therefore exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court also unanimously held that the Department of Labor's recently-announced contrary interpretation was entitled to exactly zero deference.

Christopher v. SmithKline Beacham (US Supreme Ct 06/18/2012)

Christopher, a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued the employer for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) alleging failure to pay overtime. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and denied Christopher's motion to amend the judgment based on the trial court's failure to consider an amicus brief filed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor (DOL). The 9th Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court affirmed (5-4).

The job of a pharmaceutical sales representative is to try to persuade physicians to write prescriptions for products in appropriate cases. For over 70 years DOL acquiesced in an interpretation that they were "outside salesmen" who are exempt from FLSA overtime requirements. In amicus briefs filed in Circuit courts DOL took the position that a "sale" requires a "consummated transaction." In Supreme Court briefing DOL's position was that there is no "sale" unless the employee "actually transfers title."

The Court said that the DOL's new interpretation is entitled to no deference at all because it would impose massive liability for conduct that occurred before the interpretation was announced, there had been no enforcement actions suggesting the industry was acting unlawfully, DOL gave no opportunity for public comment, and the interpretation is "flatly inconsistent" with the FLSA.

The FLSA definition of "sale" includes consignments, which do not involve a transfer of title. Although DOL regulations say that sales include the transfer of title, that does not mean a sale must include a transfer of title. The regulations also use the phrase "other disposition" which - in this unique regulatory environment - includes the work of pharmaceutical sales representatives. The representatives also bear all the exterior indicia of salesmen (average salaries exceeding $70,000, work that is difficult to standardize to a particular time frame, etc.)

The DISSENT reasoned that sales of drugs are made by pharmacists, not pharmaceutical sales representatives. The pharmaceutical sales representative neither make sales nor promote "their own sales." (The dissent agreed that the DOL's current views expressed in briefs are not entitled to any weight.)

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/06/pharma_sales_re.html

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Mark Woods: Taking leave to finish what was started (Florida Times-Union)

Share With Friends: Share on FacebookTweet ThisPost to Google-BuzzSend on GmailPost to Linked-InSubscribe to This Feed | Rss To Twitter | Law - Video News, RSS and RSS Feed via Feedzilla.

Source: http://news.feedzilla.com/en_us/stories/law/video/383661786?client_source=feed&format=rss

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Washington's sexual orientation discrimination amendment is not retroactive

The Washington State Supreme Court held today that a sexual orientation discrimination amendment adopted in 2006 is not retroactive.

The court also concluded that conduct that took place prior to the amendment is admissible background evidence to prove the discriminatory nature of certain conduct occurring after the amendment.

Loeffelholz v. Univ of Washington (Washington 09/13/2012)

Loeffelholz sued under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) claiming discrimination based on sexual orientation. WLAD was amended in 2006 to include sexual orientation as a protected class, and Loeffelholz alleged several pre-amendment acts and one post-amendment act.

The Washington Supreme Court held that (1) the WLAD amendment is not retroactive and the pre-amendment conduct is not actionable as it was not unlawful when it occurred, and (2) the post-amendment allegedly discriminatory comment is arguably similar enough to the pre-amendment conduct to survive summary judgment.

Loeffelholz alleged that her supervisor between 2003 and June 2006 maintained a hostile work environment based on sexual orientation. This was prior to the WLAD amendment. Loeffelholz also alleged a single act of discrimination by this supervisor after the WLAD amendment.

The court's findings:

(1) Pre-amendment conduct is not actionable. Retroactive application of the amendment would violate the employer's due process rights. The plain language of the amendment and its legislative history indicate only prospective application.

(2) Pre-amendment conduct is admissible as background evidence to prove why the post-amendment conduct is discriminatory.

(3) The post-amendment conduct was a single statement by Loeffelholz's supervisor, who was about to be deployed to Iraq, that he was "going to come back a very angry man." The court found that a reasonable jury could infer that this comment was a natural extension of pre-amendment conduct - the supervisor's dislike of lesbians and his anger management problems as illustrated by his comments that he had a volatile temper and kept a gun. This is enough to preclude summary judgment.

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/09/washingtons_sex.html

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Dry Times: How to Deal with the Impact of California’s Drought on Critical Commercial Agreements

On January 17, 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a “State of Emergency” in California due to the severity of drought conditions across the State.  Since then, the California drought continues to be severe and unprecedented in recent years, and is taking a pervasive toll on California residents, businesses, farm land, foliage and wildlife.  Despite recent rainfall, local water districts and the State have called for voluntary, and in some locales, mandatory reduction in consumption of water.  After considering the severe human toll, anyone doing business with an entity located in California (or other western states experiencing similar drought conditions) that requires water for any business purpose, particularly farmers in Northern and Central California where there are fewer alternative sources of water, must be concerned about inventory and the impact of the drought on its supply chain.  Can my California contract counterparty fulfill its obligations to produce sufficient quantities of produce, dairy products, steel, flowers, honey, etc., to meet my contract needs?  Waiting for a delivery that never arrives, is delayed or arrives in lower quantity or, worse yet, quality, is not a viable option.  The key is to be prepared to find an alternative supplier so that production goals can be timely met.  Successful navigation of these issues requires careful contract drafting and contemplation in advance of new agreements, and critical analysis of existing contracts.  This article highlights the pertinent legal mechanisms at work and options for your business.

Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) follows the longstanding common law derived principle of allowing the concerned recipient of supplies to demand adequate assurance of its supplier’s ability to perform.  The law adopted in most states provides that “when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.”  For purposes of Section 2-609, “reasonableness” will be “determined according to commercial standards” between merchants.  A failure by the recipient of a justified demand for adequate assurance to provide such assurances within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, will be treated as a repudiation of the contract.

The key for those seeking assurances of performance is to describe with as much specificity as possible the reasonable grounds for “insecurity.”  In the case of the drought, one does not have to look far to find news articles describing the historic drought in significant detail and showing the hardest hit regions.  The form of the demand need not be a formal lawyers’ letter, but can be a friendly request to a good, long term vendor asking for assurances that product of the quality and quantity the recipient has come to expect will continue to be delivered within the time expected.  Setting a reasonable time frame for a response to the demand is also important and will depend upon the imminence of the need for or expected receipt of goods.

The form and clarity of the response will be key and is often heavily litigated.  Anything short of a prompt promise by a supplier to meet delivery and production obligations is a red flag and may be grounds for termination of an existing contract to purchase goods from that supplier; however, an unjustified early termination of contract rights is a breach, so a party considering terminating a supplier under an agreed contract should consider the risks of termination, particularly where the supplier is attempting to retain the right to supply.  Further, before demanding adequate assurance, the recipient may wish to investigate an alternative supply chain in case the response is insufficient and goods need to be reordered from another source.

Significantly, a supplier in dire financial straits that ends up in bankruptcy may still be the recipient of a demand for adequate assurance of its ability to perform.  Indeed, asking a debtor in bankruptcy for adequate assurance of its ability to perform its contractual obligations is a prudent business approach, though the ability of the non-debtor contract party to terminate is limited (proceeding by motion before the bankruptcy court to terminate is often the appropriate option if adequate assurance is not received or if a debtor confirms that it cannot perform).

Where a contract calls not just for supplies but for services, contract parties should look beyond the UCC to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Restatement”).  Section 251 of the Restatement provides in part that “where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach,” then the “obligee may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance.”  In the Restatement, as in the UCC, failure to provide such assurance within a reasonable time is treated as a repudiation of the contract.

From the other perspective, a supplier who fears that it will be unable to meet the terms of its contract to supply goods in sufficient quantity, quality, or price, particularly where the costs of producing have markedly increased due to the impact of the drought, may attempt to invoke a claim of force majeure.  Many contracts have a force majeure provision that excuses performance (or non-performance) upon the occurrence of events such as (i) acts of God (e.g., severe droughts and storms) and (ii) man-made events (e.g., wars or certain acts of governments).  Employee strikes may also be viewed as a basis for a finding of force majeure in some contracts.

For the purposes of California law, the California Supreme Court gave the definitive definition of a force majeure in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228 (1946).  The Court explained that “‘Force majeure,’ or the Latin expression ‘vis major,’ is not necessarily limited to the equivalent of an act of God.  The test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party’s intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.”  Id. at 238.

Additionally, acts of God can be involved in related “impossibility” scenarios.  For example, in Squillante v. California Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89 (1935), the California Court of Appeal excused a grower from having to deliver a full quantity of grapes under an excuse of impossibility due to drought conditions.  There, the contract stipulated a certain quality and variety of grape.  The drought made it impossible for that grower to grow grapes of the sufficient quality and variety, and therefore the court held that the grower could not be compelled to perform impossibilities and that it could not be held liable in damages for its failure to comply with the contract because the failure resulted from no fault of its own.  (The court also stressed the importance of the “grower” not being a “dealer” of grapes, in that they suggest that a dealer may not have been so excused.)  While this case dates from 1935, it is apparently still good law.

The scenarios above do not address the situation where a supplier is not necessarily prevented from supplying, but the cost of supplying increases so significantly higher than anticipated, that performance under the contract becomes commercially “impracticable.”  While related to the concepts of force majeure and impossibility, impracticability is a distinct problem.  Section 2-615 of the UCC provides that, absent a supplier assuming a greater obligation, “delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”

A successful defense of impracticability also requires that seller “notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery,” and, in the case of reduced or limited capacity to perform, that the seller then allocate production and deliveries among his customers in a “fair and reasonable” manner.

In the Official Comments to UCC Section 2-615, the American Law Institute explained that generally, “increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.  But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section” (emphasis added).

Whether a defense of impracticability rests on the increased cost resulting from shortages of water or other inputs affected by the drought, or from a governmental regulation or order limiting access to water, impracticability clearly represents an intractable problem absent clear contract drafting and advice.  Contract drafters have several tools at their disposal to more clearly delineate the parties’ risk allocation.  For example, properly constructed force majeure clauses should address the risk of supervening events expressly in the agreement.  Additionally, “hell or high water” provisions make it clear the parties’ intend to implacably bind themselves despite any contingencies.

When problems raising impossibility, force majeure, or impracticability issues arise, the key will be managing expectations.  If buyers suspect there are delays or other issues on the horizon, they should not hesitate to seek adequate assurances of performance from their suppliers. Likewise, if there are substantial additional costs or problems in maintaining the quality or quantity or the timing of supply, suppliers should notify their buyers as soon as practicable to adequately manage the relationship in the near term and maintain the relationship as the drought subsides and production gets back on track.

Think ahead when drafting important supply contracts.  Read your contracts closely when a problem arises and reach out to counterparties early to address potential problems before they arise or worsen.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/dry-times-how-to-deal-with-the-impact-of-californias-drought-on-critical-commercial-agreements/

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12-Year-Old Kid Did What? Twice?

school bus

This kid is Trouble. That capital “T” is intentional. Why? Check out what this youngster has been up to, as reported by wmbb.com (Florida):

Police say that a 12-year-old charged in June with stealing a school bus and taking it on a joyride has done it again.

Yes, again!

According to the Parker Police Department and Bay District Schools, 12-year-old Michael Propst is charged with taking a bus from a compound at Parker Elementary School and driving it to Franklin County Tuesday evening.

In June, Propst was charged with taking a bus and driving it from the same location to the Wal-Mart on Front Beach Road, a distance of 15 miles.

15 miles! Yikes. What about this time?

This time, the youth drove the bus to Franklin County, a distance of more than 55 miles.

Shazam! Here’s the source.

 

 

 

Source: http://rss.justia.com/~r/LegalJuiceCom/~3/znzFxq3MZew/adsf-4.html

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Former New Mexico AG Settles Fraud Charges

The former governor and attorney general of New Mexico settled fraud charges brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission stemming from his role as head of a company that the agency said was secretly controlled by two ex-crooks.

Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sign_me_in.jsp?article=http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/legaltimes/PubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202663444923&rss=newswire

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THE NLJ 350: The NLJ 350 Regional Report: The Top U.S. and International Markets

Our Regional Report takes the headcount numbers from our NLJ 350 survey and dices up the data, region by region. • See the complete 2014 NLJ 350 survey results.

Source: http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1402583484262?rss=rss_nlj

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Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Wisconsin public employee collective bargaining statute amendments declared unconstitutional

A teachers' union sought declarative and injunctive relief against the governor, claiming that statutory amendments dealing with municipal employees' collective bargaining rights and payroll deductions of dues and pension contributions were unconstitutional.

The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional. Madison Teachers v. Walker (Wisconsin Circuit Ct 09/14/2012)

(1) Certain portions of the statute violated the free speech clauses of the Wisconsin and US constitutions. Although there is no constitutional right to collective bargaining, the statute imposes burdens on the speech and associational rights of employees represented by unions which burdens are not imposed on other employees. They cannot negotiate wage increases greater than the cost of living, they cannot pay dues by payroll deductions solely because the dues go to labor organizations. A ban on fair share agreements means that union members bear the cost of bargaining for non-members who receive the befits of bargaining. Requiring unions to be recertified annually burdens members with the full costs of the election.

(2) The trial court applied strict scrutiny to the equal protection claims because of the infringement on speech rights. The statute creates two classes of employees (represented and non-represented), and the defendants "offer no defense of the statute that would survive strict scrutiny."

(3) Certain portions of the statute violated the Wisconsin constitution's home rule amendment, violated the constitutional bar on impairment of contracts, and deprived employees of property without due process.

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Source: http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2012/09/wisconsin_publi.html

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Federal Judge Deems California’s Death Penalty Unconstitutional

A federal judge in California has struck down the state’s death penalty, ruling that the “arbitrariness” and “unpredictability” with which it is carried out violates the constitution’s ban on “cruel and unusual” punishment.

Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/16/federal-judge-deems-californias-death-penalty-unconstitutional/?mod=WSJBlog

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Appellate Court Issues Opinion on SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule

Yesterday, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in the challenge to the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule.  We have reviewed the D.C. Court of Appeals decision and find that it leaves much of the SEC’s rule intact.  It is specifically the requirement that companies describe products as not “DRC conflict free” in their SEC filings and on their website that the Court held constitutes “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment.  In the words of the Court:  “Products and minerals do not fight conflicts. The label ‘conflict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted. . . .  By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.”

The Court of Appeals upheld the other elements of the SEC Final Rule, however, and rejected the petitioners’ arguments about the absence of a de minimis exception and the SEC’s application of the rule to companies that only contract to manufacture products.  The decision therefore leaves intact the requirement for the issuer to conduct a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” exercise “due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals” and file a conflict minerals report in the circumstances specified in the rule.  Under the DC Circuit decision, however, an issuer cannot be required to describe its products as “not DRC conflict free” in its report.  The Court of Appeals suggested that issuers use their own language to describe their products and also invited the SEC to consider publishing a centralized list of products that it believes are affiliated with the Congo war based on information that issuers submit.

The case could be consolidated and reheard en banc with the unrelated case related to meat labelling requirements that raises a similar First Amendment issue.  It is also possible that the SEC could stay its rule until the appellate process is completed.   As of this writing there has been no word yet from the SEC.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/04/appellate-court-issues-opinion-on-secs-conflict-minerals-rule/

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Second Circuit Applies Morrison v. National Australia Bank to Allow Certain Extraterritorial Application of RICO

In European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., Case No. 11-CV-2475 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., could apply to conduct outside the territory of the United States.  In doing so, the Second Circuit addressed the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) [blog article here], which held that United States statutes are presumed not apply to extraterritorial conduct, unless Congress has clearly indicated its intent that the statute have extraterritorial application.  Applying Morrison, the Second Circuit determined that RICO could apply to extraterritorial conduct, because a number of the statutes listed as predicate acts for RICO liability clearly apply extraterritorially.  The Second Circuit ultimately concluded “that RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability or guilt could attach to extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO predicate.”  Thus, even after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, RICO liability can still attach to foreign conduct where the underlying predicate statute applies to extraterritorial conduct.

In this case, the European Community and 26 of its member states (collectively the “European Community”) brought an action against RJR Nabisco, Inc. and a number of its corporate affiliates (collectively, “RJR”) alleging that “RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the RICO statute, laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law.  The complaint alleged a number of predicate racketeering acts, as required by the RICO statue, including violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and violations of the statutes criminalizing mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering and providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations.  The complaint also alleged claims under New York state law for fraud, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, conversion and money had and received.  RJR filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing primarily that RICO could not apply to extraterritorial conduct in the wake of Morrison.

In considering RJR’s motion to dismiss, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the racketeering enterprise alleged in the complaint was a foreign enterprise “which consisted largely of a loose association of Colombian and Russian drug-dealing organizations and European money brokers whose activity was directed outside the United States.”  The district court held that the complaint failed to state a viable RICO cause of action, because the “focus” of the RICO statute is the racketeering enterprise, and, absent a domestic enterprise, Morrison’s presumption that United States statutes do not apply extraterritorially would preclude such extraterritorial application.

The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that “Congress manifested an unmistakable intent that certain of the federal statutes adopted as predicates for RICO liability apply to extraterritorial conduct.”  The Second Circuit held further that when a predicate act underlying a RICO claim applies extraterritorially, then any claim based upon that act would also.  In support of this holding, the Second Circuit cited RICO predicate statutes that only apply to extraterritorial conduct, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which criminalizes killing and attempting to kill United States nationals outside of the United States.  The Second Circuit found that these predicate statutes exhibited Congress’s intent that, in certain circumstances, RICO should apply extraterritorially.  The Second Circuit then determined that the European Community’s claims that alleged predicate acts of money laundering and providing material support for terrorism could apply extraterritorially in light of the clear indications from Congress that those statutes were designed to criminalize foreign conduct.

The Second Circuit reached a different conclusion with respect to the RICO claims based upon predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud and violations of the Travel Act.  The Court held that these claims did not apply extraterritorially because Congress did not exhibit the intent to make those statutes apply extraterritorially.  The Second Circuit, however, allowed those claims to proceed, because it held that the complaint alleged “that RJR essentially orchestrated a global money laundering scheme from the United States by sending employees and communications abroad.”  The Court held that this allegation, and other similar allegations, established a domestic enterprise and that the alleged scheme was directed at the United States in a way that had significant domestic ramifications.  Ultimately, those allegations provided a sufficient domestic nexus for the claims to proceed past the pleading stage.  The Second Circuit, however, made clear that, at trial and on summary judgment, the European Community would be required to provide proof of the domestic nature of those predicate statutory violations.

Whereas the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison dealt specifically with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Second Circuit’s application of Morrison to RICO claims in this case suggests that Morrison may have significant implications beyond the securities laws.  Future decisions likely will rely upon the Court’s approach here of carefully heeding the underlying principals articulated in Morrison, and requiring a showing of clear Congressional intent before any federal statute will be applied to extraterritorial conduct.

Source: http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2014/05/second-circuit-applies-morrison-v-national-australia-bank-to-allow-certain-extraterritorial-application-of-rico/

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